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1. Introduction  
 
Eight years ago, The European Journal of Finance (EJF) published the first special issue on the Chinese 
Capital Markets. This was at a time when Chinese topics were not widely accepted by 
internationally excellent finance journals. Since then, The European Journal of Finance has published 
five special issues both containing and encouraging studies that reveal the unique institutions of 
China. These special issues thus provide an important publication outlet for Chinese studies and a 
valuable platform within which scholars in this research can network. From 2011 to 2017, the 
market capitalisation of listed domestic companies has increased from $3.412 to $8.711 trillion, 
and China’s GDP increased from $7.573 to $12.238 trillion (World Federation of Exchange 
Database by World Bank). More importantly, China has emerged as the world’s market leader in 
Fintech and Green Finance. China has by far the highest Fintech adoption rate1 and market size 
of crowdfunding (Rau, 2017). China’s green bonds reached $32.4 billion, accounting for 40% of 
green bonds issued globally and making China the largest issuer worldwide2.  
Following the success of the four conference in 2011, 2012, 2013 and 2014 (Cumming et 
al. 2014, 2016, 2017, 2018), the 5th Conference on the Chinese Capital Markets was hosted by the 
I.H. Asper School of Business at the University of Manitoba, Canada, on July 16 and 17, 2015. 
The conference venue was James W. Burns Executive Education Centre, University of Manitoba, 
located in downtown Winnipeg. A total of 13 papers were selected for presentation by conference 
participants in four sessions, namely Financial Distress and Investment, Innovation and Reform, 
Board and Ownership, and Market Integration and Efficiency. Six papers are included in this 
special issue after the standard double blind review process.  
The keynote speaker was “Mr. IPO”, Professor Jay R. Ritter, Joseph B. Cordell Eminent 
Scholar Chair at Warrington College of Business, The University of Florida. A Special Interactive 
Session on Entrepreneurial Finance was also led by him as well as Drs Min Maung and Craig 
Wilson from the University of Saskatchewan. Professor Ritter’s keynote speech was entitled Pre-
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market trading and IPO pricing: Evidence from Taiwan (Chang et al., 2017). The most important debate 
in the IPO literature is on the rationale of underpricing: either it is fair to compensate investors 
for bearing risks, or it is excessive and driven by agency problems between underwriters and issuers. 
Taiwan has the only mandatory pre-IPO market in the world where firms are required to be traded 
on a so-called “Emerging Stock Market (ESM)” for at least six months before applying for an IPO. 
They find that the pre-market price largely determines the offer price and the more accurate the 
pre-market price is in predicting the aftermarket price, the lower the discount of the offer price 
relative to the pre-market price. The reason of high underpricing despite the pre-market trading is 
that both underwriters’ fees collected from investors and their brokerage revenues increases as 
underpricing increases. Overall, the results imply that agency problems contribute to the IPO 
underpricing even in the absence of information asymmetry.  
 
2. Contributions in the special issue 
 
This section summarises the six articles included in this special issue.  
Liu et al. (2019), titled the real effect of liquidity provision on entrepreneurial financing: evidence from a 
natural experiment in China, regard the establishment of the SME Board as an exogenous shock to 
increase liquidity provision for illiquid investment in the VC market. They find that the 
establishment of the SME Board increased VC investment, especially from newly founded VCs, 
but not entrepreneurial activities in China. They interpret the results as the supply-side increase on 
entrepreneurial financing. The also find that the establishment of the SME Board increase 
government-backed VCs more than private VCs, and increase VC investment in less developed 
regions more than it in developed regions. We encourage future studies also examine the effects 
of start-up Boards and the to-be-established Science and Technology Innovation Board that 
adopts registration-based IPO system.  
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Ding et al. (2019), titled Does China overinvest? Evidence from a panel of Chinese firms, document 
evidence of overinvestment of both state-owned and private firms in China. The former invests 
less efficiently than the latter. They attribute the overinvestment of private firms to the abundant 
cash flow generated from high profits and attribute the overinvestment of state-owned firms to 
weak screening and monitoring of banks. They indicate that overinvestment is likely to lead to 
overcapacity. We encourage future studies discuss overinvestment of Chinese firms in the content 
of the literature of soft budget-constraint by Kornai (1979). In centralized economies, firms often 
acquire subsidies or loans more than would have been considered efficient. 
Jacoby et al. (2019), titled Financial distress, political affiliation and earnings management: the case of 
politically affiliated private firms, find that private Chinese firms that experience financial distress are 
more likely to engage in positive earnings management in order to ensure a continued access to 
debt financing than publicly-listed firms. Since politically-connected private firms, especially these 
located in regions with less developed institutions, can still access to financial resources and 
government support under financial distress, they have less incentive to engage in positive earnings 
management. Future studies may compare the effects of different types of political connections. 
Huyghebaert and Wang (2019), titled Value creation and value distribution in Chinese listed firms: 
The role of ownership structure, board characteristics, and control, make use of a panel of Chinese firms listed 
in Shanghai over the period 2001-2005 to analyse the extent to which Chinese listed companies’ 
ownership structure and board characteristics affect the value creation and the proportional 
distribution of this generated value among shareholders. The results suggest that what helps to 
improve firms’ value creation does not necessarily contribute to the proportional allocation of their 
created value. Specifically, the fraction of voting rights controlled by the firm’s largest ultimate 
shareholder is positively associated with value creation. This effect is found to be stronger for 
privately controlled firms. Further results suggest that a managerial ownership stake and a larger 
fraction of voting rights controlled by countervailing shareholders are positively associated with 
value creation only for privately controlled firms. Whilst, board size is not found to have any effect 
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on value creation, independent directors do contribute to value creation for state-controlled 
companies. All results are robust to using different measures of value creation. Focusing on value 
distribution, the authors find that for listed state-controlled enterprises, the fraction of voting 
rights controlled by the State increases the likelihood and size of related-party transactions (RPT), 
while it reduces the odds and magnitude of cash dividends. The results also suggest that managerial 
ownership encourages cash dividends in privately controlled firms, whilst it reduced the likelihood 
of RPT in state-controlled firms. Furthermore, countervailing shareholders restrain RPT and 
promote cash dividends for all types of firms. Finally, a larger fraction of independent directors 
on the board stimulates the payout of earnings as cash dividends.  Overall, the results of this paper 
are important because the authors recognize that value creation and value distribution are 
sufficiently distinct theoretical concepts, while academic research has not always fully accounted 
for their differences.  Moreover, academic research to date has not clearly explored how internal 
corporate governance mechanisms could play a distinctive role in the processes of value creation 
versus value distribution. 
Haß et al. (2019), titled State-ownership and bank loan contracting: Evidence from corporate fraud, 
make use of a sample of bank loans and enforcement actions announced between 2001 and 2012 
to investigate the extent to which ownership characteristics of borrowers and lenders affect the 
consequences of corporate fraud. The results suggest that the cost of private borrowing rises 
significantly after fraud announcements. Yet, this effect does not manifest itself if the loans are 
issued by state-owned banks and directed towards state-owned enterprises. Furthermore, the 
authors document that those state-owned companies which benefit from more favourable rates 
from state-owned banks after the announcement of a fraud perform worse than other companies. 
These findings have significant policy implications as they suggest that state-owned banks continue 
to prefer lending to state-owned enterprises, even though these firms generally perform worse 
than private companies. The government should therefore continue to reform China’s banking 
industry in order to improve lending efficiency.  
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Farag and Mallin (2019), tilted Monitoring corporate boards: evidence from China, test the main 
board structure hypotheses, namely the scope of operations, monitoring and negotiation 
hypotheses, based on Chinese IPO firms. They find that independent directors might be a 
substituting mechanism for the supervisors’ monitoring role and that there might be conflicts between 
corporate boards and supervisory boards. We encourage future studies provide more insights on the 
interaction between the two boards and take further efforts to make a causal inference.  
 
3. Discussions and Future Research 
 
2018 marks the 40th anniversary of China's reform and opening-up, which brought about 
the economic miracle. Xu (2011) attributes it to the regional competition and experimentation 
governed by China’s regionally decentralised authoritarian (RDA) regime as the fundamental 
institutions of China’s reform and development, which is a combination of decentralised economic 
governance and centralised political governance. Allen et al. (2005) indicate that private sector 
grows much faster than the others and provides most of the economy's growth. The separation 
between the Party and the government (and the companies) was an important legacy of Deng 
Xiaoping. In 2017, however, the 19th National Congress of CPC (Communist Party of China) 
revised the party constitution and strengthen the CPC’s role to “lead everything”. 
The Organization Department of CPC and the Party Committee of the State Assets 
Supervision and Administration Commission had issued a notice on 15 March 2017 to require all 
state-owned enterprise, including the non-listed ones, to explicitly put forward the Party building 
in the bylaws, specifying the Party organization’s structure, status, responsibility, staffing, funding 
and the operational mechanism for the Party committee to discuss major issues. To comply with 
this requirement, China Railway Group Limited which floats in both Shanghai and Hong Kong 
stock exchanges, for example, held the board meeting on 28 April 2017 to deliberate and approve 
the proposal on a revised bylaw. On 28 June 2017, the revised bylaw was voted through with 95.28% 
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support in the Annual General Meeting (AGM). The revised bylaw added that the board should 
listen to the advice from the Party Committee before making decisions on important issues and 
that the chair of the board and the Party Secretary shall be one person. Some private firms also 
voluntarily made the change. Linewell Software, a private listed firm, for example, revised its bylaw 
and added that the Party Committee shall bring forward the opinions on the nominated candidates 
for the posts of senior executives or recommend the list of candidates directly to the CEO.  
The CSRC (China Securities Regulatory Commission) promulgates the new Code of 
Corporate Governance for Listed Companies in China on 30 September 2018, which intends to integrate 
the Community Party into the corporate governance of all listed firms. Specifically, Article 5 
requires that all listed firms shall set up a Chinese communist organization to carry out activities 
of the Party and listed firms shall provide necessary conditions for the activities of the Party 
organization. To encourage small and medium-sized private enterprises and foreign firms to carry 
forward the work of Party building, many industrial parks, office premises, shopping centres and 
even Internet communities set up Party branches.  
On the one hand, this could be regarded as a U-turn of the principle of the separation of 
enterprise from administration since the third plenary meeting of the 14th central committee of 
CPC (Chinese Communist Party) in 1993. The free enterprise system is undermined since the Party 
can directly intervene the operation of firms, even including private firms and foreign firms 
operated in mainland China. Given the findings in the literature (e.g. Fan et al., 2007) that 
government bureaucrats, often Communist Party members, lack incentives and ability to enhance 
firm performance when act as CEOs, it is not clear about the value of the advice of the Party 
Committee or the consequence when the board refuse to adopt Party’s advice. On the other hand, 
the Party’s Central Commission for Discipline Inspection successfully mitigate the corruption of 
state-owned enterprises (Wang et al., 2018) in the anti-corruption campaign. It is likely that the 
Party committee could help to monitor executives. The net effects represent an important research 
question.  
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Meanwhile, the government also intend to enable employees and Labour Union to 
participate in the management of private enterprise. In September 2018, the Ministry of Human 
Resources and Social Security hold a national conference and a vice minister stressed that “in order 
to deepening democratic management of private enterprises, the leadership of the Party must be strengthened, the 
principal position of the staff and workers must be upheld, institutional assurance must be reinforced”. He asked 
private enterprises to allow employees to participate management together and to share the gains 
of firms, and support Labour Union to play an overall coordinating role.  In Qingdao, a major city 
in the east of Shandong Province, the local government sent officials to private enterprises to act 
as the part-time chairman of the Labour Union, spending 8 working days a month for two years. 
While employee representatives typically join supervisory boards in China to perform a monitoring 
role and Labour Union has a fundamental responsibility to safeguard the legitimate rights and 
interests of employees, the legal or theoretical basis for them to directly participate the 
management of private enterprises is not clear and the implication on firm policy and outcome 
need to be carefully examined.  
In 1995, the fifth plenary session of the 14th CPC Central Committee set up the principle 
of invigorate big SOEs in critical industries while relaxing control over small ones. Following this, 
many underperformed SOEs were privatised and their performance was improved when controls 
were passed to a private entity (Chen et al., 2008). The 2014 Central Economic Work Conference, 
however, put forward a new principle that SOEs should be made unswervingly stronger and better. 
In 2016, General Secretary Xi Jingping added that it is absolutely not allowed to make SOEs 
smaller, collapsed or disappear. The fluctuation in profit and even liquidation are normal market 
phenomena. To ensure SOEs can only grow bigger, adequate resources and favoured treatment 
must be provided. This new principle may have distorted resource allocation and attributed to the 
hardship of private sectors in recent years. When supply side structure reform was implemented 
by means of administrative decapacity and environmental inspection, private enterprises were the 
major targets. From January to September 2018, at least 24 listed private firms transfered control 
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to holding companies of the government. Foreign firms also find harder to operate in China. The 
2018 China-US trade war also reflects the US’s concern on China’s expanded usage of state-
directed and market-distorting policies3.  
Overall, there have been a series of legislative and regulatory changes that has strengthened 
the role of the Chinese Communist Party in the economy and society under the “Party leads 
everything” doctrine. We encourage future studies to examine their implications on finance and 
economics. We believe that the results of such studies will be helpful for the CPC and the Chinese 
Government to shape future policies to ensure sustainable development.  
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